## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA EASTERN DIVISION

COREY LIDELL WOODARD,

Movant,

No. C08-1043-LRR No. CR07-1014-LRR

VS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

**ORDER** 

This matter appears before the court on Corey Lidell Woodard's motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (docket no. 1). On December 8, 2008, Corey Lidell Woodard ("the movant") filed his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. On October 21, 2010, the court directed the government to respond to the movant's claims (docket no. 13). On November 24, 2010, the government complied with the court's order by filing a resistance (docket no. 14). On December 6, 2010, the movant filed a reply (docket no. 15). The court now turns to consider the movant's motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

A district court is given discretion in determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. *See United States v. Oldham*, 787 F.2d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 1986). In exercising that discretion, the district court must determine whether the alleged facts, if true, entitle the movant to relief. *See Payne v. United States*, 78 F.3d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 1996). "Accordingly, [a district court may summarily dismiss a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 without an evidentiary hearing] if (1) the . . . allegations, accepted as true, would not entitle the [movant] to relief, or (2) the allegations cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently

incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact." *Engelen v. United States*, 68 F.3d 238, 240-41 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); *see also Delgado v. United States*, 162 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary where allegations, even if true, do not warrant relief or allegations cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record or lack factual evidence and rely on conclusive statements); *United States v. Hester*, 489 F.2d 48, 50 (8th Cir. 1973) (stating that no evidentiary hearing is necessary where the files and records of the case demonstrate that relief is unavailable or where the motion is based on a question of law). Stated differently, a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion can be dismissed without a hearing where "the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255; *see also Standing Bear v. United States*, 68 F.3d 271, 272 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).

The court concludes that it is able to resolve most of the movant's claims from the record. *See Rogers v. United States*, 1 F.3d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding "[a]ll of the information that the court needed to make its decision with regard to [the movant's] claims was included in the record . . . ." and, therefore, the court "was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing") (citing Rule Governing Section 2255 Proceedings 8(a) and *United States v. Raddatz*, 447 U.S. 667, 674, 100 S. Ct. 2406, 65 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1980)). The evidence of record conclusively demonstrates that the movant is not entitled to the relief sought on all of his claims except his failure to file a notice of appeal claim. Specifically, the record indicates that, except for the failure to file a notice of appeal claim, the movant's claims are procedurally barred, untimely, and/or without merit. As such, the court finds that there is only a need to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the movant's failure to file a notice of appeal claim.

With respect to the merits of the movant's statutory penalty claims and 100 to 1 ratio between cocaine base and powder cocaine claims, the court deems it appropriate to deny the movant's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion for the reasons stated in the government's

resistance. The government's brief adequately sets forth the law that is applicable to the facts in the movant's case. Specifically, the government correctly concluded that defense counsel provided professional and effective assistance to the movant and the movant suffered no prejudice as a result of counsel's actions. The record clearly reveals that, after being advised of the maximum sentence that he faced, the movant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty. The movant's current mis-characterization of the impact that federal statutes had on his sentence is not a valid basis for relief. And, the government correctly points out that the movant's additionally argument with respect to the cocaine base and powder cocaine disparity is procedurally barred, untimely and without merit.

Moreover, the court thoroughly reviewed the record and finds that dismissing the majority of the movant's claims results in no "miscarriage of justice" and is consistent with the "rudimentary demands of fair procedure." Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S. Ct. 468, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1962); see also United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised for the first time on direct appeal and, if uncorrected, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice." (citing *Poor Thunder v. United States*, 810 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1987))). The court concludes that the movant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that he entered into with the government. See Walker v. United States, 115 F.3d 603, 604 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[A] valid guilty plea forecloses an attack on conviction unless 'on the face of the record the court had no power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence."). Further, the court concludes that the conduct of counsel fell within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and counsel's performance did not prejudice the movant's defense, id. at 692-94. Considering all the circumstances and refraining from engaging in hindsight or second-guessing counsel's strategic decisions, the court finds that the record belies the movant's claims and no violation of the movant's

constitutional right to counsel occurred. Nothing the movant states in support of his request for relief leads the court to conclude that a violation of the Sixth Amendment occurred. Lastly, the court finds that the claims asserted in the movant's June 19, 2009 pleading are procedurally defaulted because the movant failed to raise them on direct appeal. *See McNeal v. United States*, 249 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir. 2001) (discussing when claims are procedurally defaulted); *United States v. Samuelson*, 722 F.2d 425, 427 (8th Cir. 1983) (concluding that a collateral proceeding is not a substitute for a direct appeal and refusing to consider matters which could have been raised on direct appeal). Alternatively, the court finds that they are untimely and without merit.

In sum, all of the alleged errors except the failure to file a notice of appeal claim do not warrant relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The court finds that those claims are without merit, procedurally defaulted and/or untimely. Accordingly, they are dismissed. With respect to the remaining failure to file a notice of appeal claim, the court deems it appropriate to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

## IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

- 1) Except for the failure to file a notice of appeal claim, the movant's claims are dismissed.
- A hearing is scheduled to commence at 11:00 a.m. central time on December 29, 2011. With respect to such hearing, the movant is directed to participate via telephone. Additionally, the clerk's office is directed to appoint CJA counsel to represent the movant. Appointed counsel is directed to notify the court of the name of the movant's counselor and the telephone number where

he can be reached at least five days prior to the evidentiary hearing. The clerk's office is directed to send a copy of this order to the movant.

**DATED** this 13th day of December, 2011.

LINDA R. READE

CHIEF JUDGE, U.S. DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA